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Introduction 
 
Europe’s1 slow recovery after its double-dip crisis continued in 2016, with the continent’s 
growth rate reaching 1.8 per cent. While by no means a spectacular pace, it fits into the 
broader pattern of the previous two years, and given the weak performance of the global 
economy, as well as mounting geopolitical uncertainties, it is not to be underestimated. The 
recovery, mainly driven by consumption and renewed investment, has had a strong impact on 
labour markets, with unemployment rates across the continent decreasing for the third year in 
a row. Inflation, heavily subdued in 2015 and bordering on deflation, picked up. Government 
balances continued to improve and average public debt edged slightly downwards. The 
legacies of the crisis, however, are still holding Europe back. 
 
The year 2016 will not be remembered for major economic events and turning points, but 
rather for two unexpected political shocks that rocked Europe and the world. Brexit, and the 
impacts it is likely to have on existing trade and investment patterns, dealt a heavy blow on 
the whole integration process. The strong belief that the European Union was an irreversible 
enterprise, an unbreakable polity that was slowly but steadily approaching an ever closer 
union, is now probably nothing more than an illusion. Additionally, the election of Donald 
Trump in the US is widely believed to bolster inward-looking, highly protectionist economic 
policies not just across the Atlantic, but all over the world. The consequences of these two 
political events, especially their long term effects on trade flows, can create a real turning 
point for the future of Europe. 
 
This contribution aims to analyze the economic performance of the EU and its member states, 
focusing on developments in 2016, but also placing them into a wider context. As with our 
contributions to previous Annual Reviews (Benczes and Szent-Iványi, 2015, 2016), we 
identify some evidence of convergence, but also highlight the heterogeneity of member state 
performance in the areas of economic growth, inflation, unemployment and government 
finances. 
 
2017 marks the tenth anniversary of the global financial crisis, which soon turned into a 
global economic crisis (Trichet, 2010), and led to Europe’s sovereign debt crisis. The second 
half of the contribution reflects on the European origins of the crisis, and provides a less 
evident interpretation, focusing on current accounts and external imbalances. Although 
                                                          
* We are grateful to the editors, Nathaniel Copsey and Tim Haughton, for insightful and constructive comments. 
1 Unless otherwise stated, Europe refers to the EU28. Europe and EU are used as synonyms. 
3 
 
considered today as a sovereign debt crisis, we argue Europe’s crisis was a private debt crisis 
in its origins (see especially Baldwin and Giavazzi, 2015). We explore this argument by 
scrutinizing the external positions of eurozone member states in the years preceding the crisis. 
While substantial attention has been dedicated to external imbalances in the US and China in 
both scholarly and policy circles, there was much less attention on the inherent problems of 
the euro area during the pre-crisis era (Barnes et al., 2010). With a firm eye on current 
accounts, however, the contribution will also identify post-crisis structural and 
competitiveness problems that may prolong the recovery of some of the crisis-hit economies.  
 
Section I discusses the global economic and political context, which is followed in Section II 
by a presentation of Europe’s main economic indicators in terms of economic growth, 
inflation, employment and general government positions. Section III presents the arguments 
on the relationship between current account imbalances and the crisis, and Section IV 
discusses external balance and competitiveness related issues post-crisis. The contribution 
ends with some brief concluding remarks.  
 
 
I. The Global Context – Politics over Policy 
 
Global output expanded by 3.0 per cent in 2016, but differences in country performances were 
rather substantial. By and large, advanced economies performed well below the world average 
(1.7 per cent), while emerging markets and developing economies managed to significantly 
outperform advanced economies by an average growth rate of 4.0 per cent. While this is 
slightly faster than the previous year, it nonetheless represents longer term deceleration. 
Needless to say, there were significant variations within these two groups.  
 
The USA performed around the average of advanced economies (1.6 per cent), but the 
American data were undeniably surprising following a 2.6 per cent growth rate in 2015 and 
2.4 per cent in 2014. In Japan, it was business as usual with its 0.7 per cent growth rate. 
Among emerging markets and developing economies, China (6.6 per cent) and India (7.4 per 
cent) strongly outperformed others, while Sub-Saharan Africa (1.4 per cent) and Nigeria in 
particular (-1.7 per cent) produced weak numbers in 2016 (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: The global economic context – Global and regional GDP growth rates 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016* 
World 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.1 3.0 
Advanced economies 1.1 1.2 1.9 2.2 1.7 
EU -0.5 0.2 1.6 2.2 1.8 
USA 2.2 1.7 2.4 2.6 1.6 
Japan 1.7 1.4 0.0 0.5 0.7 
Emerging and developing economies 5.3 4.9 4.5 3.8 4.0 
Brazil 1.9 3.0 0.1 -3.8 -3.1 
China 7.9 7.8 7.3 6.9 6.6 
India 5.3 6.3 7.0 7.2 7.4 
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Russia 3.4 1.3 0.6 -3.7 -1.0 
Source: European Commission (2016a, p. 185). 
Note: * indicates forecast data. 
 
China continued its deliberate transition to a new regime with the aim of gearing the Chinese 
economy away from investment and industry towards domestic consumption and the service 
sector (Lu, 2017). Yet, the change came with significant challenges and even surprises: while 
private investment did slow down somewhat, it did not come with buoyant domestic private 
consumption, cementing the current account in surplus at 2.5 per cent (IMF, 2016b). As a 
response to weak private consumption, the government fuelled public investment in physical 
infrastructure, postponed the much awaited consolidation of state-owned enterprises, and was 
not willing to cool down credit expansion either in 2016.  
 
India could have become the positive story of 2016, as strengthened terms of trade, reduced 
external vulnerability and nominal interest rate cuts paved the way for a remarkably strong 
performance, but the financial chaos caused by the unexpected withdrawal of the most widely 
used banknotes from circulation made the final balance dubious, leaving the prospects for 
2017 rather uncertain.2 
 
It is expected that Brazil faced the last year of recession in 2016 by experiencing a drop of 3.1 
per cent of its GDP. Both consumption (-4.1 per cent) and investment activities (-11.3 per 
cent) experienced a drastic reduction (IMF, 2016d). Nevertheless, as the new government did 
not hesitate to engage in much-needed macroeconomic reforms (especially in public 
finances), Brazil has now good chances for positive growth in 2017. Its recovery, however, is 
fragile thanks to both economic and political tensions. In fact, the whole Latin American 
continent had a bad year in 2016 with an average growth rate of -0.6 per cent. 
 
Recession continued in Russia in 2016 due to low oil prices and economic sanctions against 
the Putin regime. According to the IMF (2016c), the setback could have been even more 
devastating without the effective policy responses of the Russian government, including fiscal 
stimulus and the adoption of a flexible exchange rate regime.  
 
Geopolitics and the consequent humanitarian crisis put serious drags on economic activity as 
well. Crises in the Middle East, terrorist attacks across the world, including major capital 
cities in Europe, institutionalized uncertainty and fear. Undeniably, the flows of refugees to 
the EU had an impact on the British vote to exit the EU. Although Europe is still struggling 
with its economy, this time the major threat to the very idea of an ever closer union has come 
from the realm of politics.  
 
 
 
                                                          
2 The two largest denomination banknotes, the 500 and 1,000 rupee notes, were the bases of the huge Indian 
underground (or cash) economy. The government aimed at clearing up the economy by refusing the acceptance 
of these two banknotes as legal tender. 
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II. Europe’s Performance: Growth, Inflation, Public Finances and Labour Markets 
 
Europe generally maintained its growth momentum in 2016, with real GDP growing by 1.8 
per cent. While this represents a slight slowdown compared to 2015, it is nonetheless a 
noteworthy performance given the global economic situation as well as the rising political and 
economic uncertainties within Europe and beyond. As in 2015, private consumption 
continued to be the main driver of growth, still reflecting the rise in disposable incomes. 
Investments also contributed significantly to Europe’s performance. The growth of exports, 
however, slowed due to two major causes: the effects of the euro’s earlier appreciation have 
tapered out and global trade flows significantly weakened. The fall in growth rates across 
much of the emerging world clearly had a negative impact on Europe’s performance as well. 
Legacies of the crisis, especially in terms of high public and private debt, as well as a high 
share of non-performing loans in some, mostly crisis-hit, countries also continued to be a drag 
on economic growth. 
 
Many individual member states recorded relatively good growth performance. As with 
previous years, the newer member states outperformed the older ones yet again. As shown in 
Table 2, countries like Romania, Slovenia, Malta, Poland and Estonia all grew by more than 3 
per cent, and some other new members like Hungary (2.2 per cent) also performed above the 
EU average. In terms of the older member states, Ireland continued its highly dynamic 
recovery following the crisis. Most surprisingly however, the UK was the best performing 
large member state. While most experts predicted an immediate and sharp market reaction to 
the country’s referendum result to leave the EU, the UK thrived in 2016. While UK-based 
firms have in general refrained from large investments, dynamic consumer spending has more 
than made up for the gap. Germany also showed good performance with 2 per cent growth, 
but growth in France was a relatively low 1.1 per cent. The slow acceleration of economic 
growth in Italy continued, reaching 1.5 per cent, which was an excellent performance after 
years of stagnation. Among the old members, the performance of Spain (2.8 per cent) and 
Denmark (2.6 per cent) was also noteworthy.  
 
With the exception of Cyprus, still suffering from the aftermath of its banking and sovereign 
debt crisis of 2012-2013, no member state economy contracted in 2016. Bulgaria (0.9 per 
cent), Finland (0.8 per cent) and Croatia (0.7 per cent) all registered relatively weak growth 
rates, and although Greece continued to limp on with 1 per cent, this was nowhere near the 
growth rate the country would need in order to make up for the losses in living standards it 
suffered due to its sovereign debt crisis. 
 
Table 2: Average EU growth rates (in per cent) and the best and worst performing Member 
States 
 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016* 
EU average -0.5 0.2 1.6 2.2 1.8 
Standard 
deviation 
2.5 2.2 1.9 4.7** 1.2 
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Best 
performers 
Estonia (4.3) 
Latvia (4.0) 
Lithuania (3.8) 
Malta (2.9) 
Malta (4.5) 
Luxembourg (4.2) 
Lithuania (3.5) 
Romania (3.5) 
Latvia (2.9) 
Ireland (8.5) 
Luxembourg (4.7) 
Hungary (4.0) 
Malta (3.5) 
Lithuania (3.5) 
Ireland (26.3) 
Luxembourg 
(6.2) 
Hungary (4.5) 
Malta (4.1) 
Lithuania (3.9) 
Poland (3.8) 
Romania (3.7) 
Romania (5.2) 
Ireland (4.1) 
Luxembourg (4.1) 
Slovenia (3.6) 
Malta (3.4) 
Poland (3.4) 
Estonia (3.2) 
Lithuania (3.1) 
UK (3.1) 
Worst 
performers 
Cyprus (-3.2) 
Portugal (-4.0) 
Greece (-7.3) 
Greece (-3.2) 
Cyprus (-6.0) 
Croatia (-0.5) 
Finland (-0.7) 
Cyprus (-1.5) 
Croatia (0.7) 
Finland (0.2) 
Cyprus (-0.2) 
Cyprus (-0.3) 
Source: authors, based on European Commission (2016a, p. 158). 
Notes: the ‘best performers’ are the countries which showed rates at least one standard deviation higher than the 
EU average. ‘Worst performers’ are at least one standard deviation lower. * indicates forecast data. ** excluding 
Ireland, as its high growth rate would distort the standard deviation.  
 
After heavily subdued inflation and indeed deflation in many member states in recent years, 
the pace of consumer price growth picked up somewhat in 2016 to 0.3 per cent (see Table 3). 
This is a highly welcome development, as it moves the EU further away from the danger zone 
of deflation. Higher inflation was mainly driven by energy price increases in the second half 
of the year. Most individual member states remained far from the European Central Bank’s 
(ECB’s) two per cent target, signalling that there is still plenty of scope for the Bank’s growth 
supporting, expansionary monetary policies. While deflation was present in some member 
states, especially the ones which were struggling with domestic demand and growth, 
including Cyprus, Croatia and Bulgaria, it is surprising that Romania, the country which 
showed the best growth performance in 2016, also saw a one per cent decrease in the level of 
its consumer prices.  
 
Table 3: Average EU inflation rates (harmonized indices of consumer prices, in percentages) 
and countries with the lowest and highest values 
 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016* 
EU average 2.6 1.5 0.5 0 0.3 
Standard 
deviation 
0.9 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.7 
High 
inflation 
Hungary (5.7) 
Estonia (4.2) 
Poland (3.7) 
Slovakia (3.7) 
Czech 
Republic (3.5) 
Estonia (3.2) 
Romania (3.2) 
Netherlands (2.6) 
UK (2.6) 
Austria (1.5) 
UK (1.5) 
Romania (1.4) 
France (1.2) 
Malta (1.2) 
Austria (0.8) 
Sweden (0.7) 
Belgium (0.6) 
Belgium (1.7) 
Sweden (1.1) 
Austria (1.0) 
Malta (1.0) 
Low inflation 
or deflation 
Greece (1.0) 
Sweden (0.9) 
Bulgaria (0.4) 
Cyprus (0.4) 
Portugal (0.4) 
Sweden (0.4) 
Latvia (0.0) 
Greece (-0.9) 
Spain (-0.2) 
Portugal (-0.2) 
Cyprus (-0.3) 
Greece (-1.4) 
Bulgaria (-1.6) 
Spain (-0.6) 
Lithuania (-0.7) 
Poland (-0.7) 
Slovenia (-0.8) 
Bulgaria (-1.1) 
Greece (-1.1) 
Cyprus (-1.5) 
Spain (-0.4) 
Slovakia (-0.5) 
Bulgaria (-0.9) 
Croatia (-0.9) 
Romania (-1.0) 
Cyprus (-1.1) 
7 
 
Source: authors, based on European Commission (2016a, p. 166). 
Notes: countries with ‘low inflation or deflation’ are the ones which showed inflation rates at least one standard 
deviation below the EU average. ‘High inflation’ countries are at least one standard deviation higher. * indicates 
forecast data. 
 
While in the last couple of years the ECB and national central banks outside the EMU were 
eagerly looking for different sorts of unconventional policy actions with the hope of boosting 
aggregate demand, fiscal policy seemed to be rather neutral.3 This has however changed more 
recently when the European Commission (2016b), called for more proactive fiscal policies in 
order to support central banks (the ECB in particular) and to provide better chances for 
accelerated output growth in the near future. Evidently, the near to zero nominal interest rates 
can make fiscal policy actions rather effective in terms of fiscal multipliers, if such policies 
are ready to engage in a more positive fiscal stance. 
 
Due to the long years of contractionary (2010-2013) and neutral (2014-2015) fiscal policy, 
substantial fiscal space opened up for most of the member states in 2016. Excessive deficit 
procedures (EDPs) do not threaten too many countries either. Most of the nations under EDP 
– such as Spain, France, Greece, Portugal, Croatia and the UK – were granted an extension to 
get their public finances in order by 2017. In 2016, both Greece and Portugal managed to 
knock their fiscal deficit below 3 per cent. Only three countries, France, the UK and Spain, 
violated the threshold last year; though at least none of them experienced a worsening fiscal 
position compared to 2015 (see Table 4). Luxembourg, Germany and Estonia, on the other 
hand, produced quite remarkable surpluses in 2016, repeating their performance of the 
previous year.  
 
Table 4. Average general government budget balances (in per cent of GDP) in the EU, and 
best/worst performers 
 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016* 
EU average -3.8 -3.5 -3.0 -2.0 -1.5 
Standard 
deviation 
2.6 3.3 2.5 1.8 1.4 
Best 
performers 
Germany (0.1) 
Luxembourg (0.1) 
Estonia (-0.3) 
Bulgaria (-0.5) 
Sweden (-0.9) 
Luxembourg 
(0.6) 
Germany (0.1) 
Sweden (-0.9) 
Estonia (0.7) 
Germany (0.3) 
Luxembourg 
(1.6) 
Germany (0.7) 
Sweden (0.2) 
Estonia (0.1) 
Luxembourg 
(1.3) 
Germany (0.6) 
Estonia (0.5) 
Sweden (0.0) 
Worst 
performers 
Ireland (-8.0) 
UK (-8.3) 
Greece (-8.6) 
Spain (-10.3) 
Spain (-6.8) 
Greece (-12.2) 
Slovenia (-14.6) 
Croatia (-5.6) 
UK (-5.7) 
Bulgaria (-5.8) 
Spain (-5.9) 
Portugal (-7.2) 
Cyprus (-8.9) 
UK (-4.3) 
Portugal (-4.4) 
Spain (-5.1) 
Greece (-7.5) 
France (-3.5) 
UK (-3.5) 
Spain (-4.6) 
Source: authors, based on European Commission (2016, p. 175). 
Notes: the ‘best performers’ are the countries which showed rates at least one standard deviation higher than the 
EU average. ‘Worst performers’ are at least one standard deviation lower. * indicates forecast data.  
                                                          
3 On the eurozone, see Hodson’s contributions to this and previous Annual Reviews. 
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Despite a downward trend, public debt is still a noteworthy issue in the EU (see Table 5). 
Debt overhang has become a serious burden on most member states, repressing private 
investment and consumption, and making the eurozone highly susceptible to further crises 
(Corsetti, 2015). Interest payment on public debt nonetheless remained at manageable levels 
in the three worst performers: 3.4 per cent in Greece, 3.9 per cent in Italy and 4.3 per cent in 
Portugal.  
 
Table 5: Average general government budget balances (in per cent of GDP) in the EU, and 
best/worst performers 
 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016* 
Mean 68.7 72.3 73.4 71.7 71.2 
Standard 
deviation 
35.4 38.1 37.9 37.7 38.0 
Best 
performers 
Estonia (9.7) 
Bulgaria (16.7) 
Luxembourg 
(21.8) 
Estonia (10.2) 
Bulgaria (17.0) 
Luxembourg 
(23.5) 
Estonia (10.7) 
Luxembourg 
(22.7) 
Bulgaria (27.0) 
Estonia (10.1) 
Luxembourg 
(22.1) 
Bulgaria (26.0) 
Estonia (9.9) 
Luxembourg 
(21.0) 
Bulgaria (29.0) 
Worst 
performers 
Ireland (119.5) 
Italy (123.3) 
Portugal 
(126.2) 
Greece (159.6) 
Ireland (119.5) 
Italy (129.0) 
Portugal 
(129.0) 
Greece (177.4) 
Italy (131.9) 
Portugal (130.6) 
Greece (179.7) 
Portugal 
(129.0) 
Italy (132.3) 
Greece (177.4) 
Portugal 
(130.5) 
Italy (132.8) 
Greece (179.7) 
Source: authors, based on European Commission (2016, p. 178). 
Notes: the ‘best performers’ are the countries which showed rates at least one standard deviation higher than the 
EU average. ‘Worst performers’ are at least one standard deviation lower. * indicates forecast data. 
 
In line with a growing economy, job creation was strong in 2016, and labour markets 
improved across Europe (Table 6). Nonetheless, considerable slack still remains, and 
unemployment rates, standing at 8.6 per cent, are still to meet their pre-crisis levels. The 
employment rate however was higher in 2016 than before the crisis, increasing to above 71 
per cent. The Czech Republic (4.2), Germany (4.6) and the UK (4.9) had the lowest levels of 
unemployment, but countries like Malta, Hungary and Austria also recorded levels below 6 
per cent. The decrease in the unemployment rate continued in the Southern countries as well, 
many of which had been battling very high levels for years. Spain’s good growth performance 
had a strong impact on the labour market, but even the more weakly growing countries 
managed to decrease their unemployment rate. Much of the new employment across the EU, 
however, are part time contracts, and many countries in Europe suffer from high structural 
unemployment. 
 
Table 6: Average EU unemployment rates (in per cent of total labour force) and the best and 
worst performing member states 
 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016* 
EU average 10.5 10.9 10.2 9.4 8.6 
9 
 
Standard 
deviation 
5.0 5.4 5.2 4.8 4.3 
Best 
performers 
Austria (4.9) 
Luxembourg (5.1) 
Germany (5.4) 
Germany (5.2) 
Austria (5.4) 
Germany (5) Germany (4.6) Czech 
Republic (4.2) 
Worst 
performers 
Portugal (15.8) 
Croatia (16) 
Greece (24.5) 
Spain (24.8) 
Portugal (16.4) 
Croatia (17.3) 
Spain (26.1) 
Greece (27.5) 
Cyprus (16.1) 
Croatia (17.3) 
Spain (24.5) 
Greece (26.5) 
Cyprus (15) 
Croatia (16.3) 
Spain (22.1) 
Greece (24.9) 
Croatia (13.4) 
Spain (19.7) 
Greece (23.5) 
Source: authors, based on European Commission (2016, p. 169). 
Notes: the ‘best performers’ are the countries which showed unemployment rates at least one standard deviation 
below the EU average. ‘Worst performers’ are at least one standard deviation higher. * indicates forecast data. 
 
 
III. The Current Account and the Crisis 
 
According to Ben Bernanke (2005), former chair of the Federal Reserve, the road to the 
economic and financial crisis of 2008 was paved by the so-called global savings glut which 
allowed advanced economies like the US and some of the European nations to relax 
substantially their credit constraints.4 Some researchers tried to warn against the downside 
risk of the increasing external imbalances in developed economies. Blanchard (2007), for 
instance, identified this phenomenon with exceptional clarity as a consequence of the great 
moderation, i.e. unusually low central banking interest rates, the proliferation of financial 
innovation and the consequent credit boom.5 By contrasting the current account deficits of 
rich nations on the one hand and external deficits in Latin America of the early 1980s and 
Mexico in the early 1990s on the other hand, he managed to demonstrate that this time the 
banking sector or especially fiscal policy played only a marginal role. According to 
Blanchard, the global crisis was the result of the saving and investment decisions of the 
private sector of the rich countries. While emerging countries also played a highly significant 
role, this was rather different than in the 1980s or 1990s: their excess savings generated a 
massive outflow of capital, which found its ultimate destination in advanced economies. The 
depressed investment climate in Asia (Chinn and Ito, 2007) along with exchange rate 
manipulation in China (Clarida, 2006) significantly contributed to this trend.  
 
Yet, concerns over the possible – and negative – long-term consequences of external 
imbalances appeared only sporadically within the eurozone. With the launch of the single 
currency the general expectation was that capital flows from the EU core to its periphery 
would speed up the convergence and integration process of the latter.6 Capital flows were 
supposed to contribute to the restructuring of these economies by helping them climb the 
development ladder i.e. by moving away from resource and (unskilled) labour-intensive 
                                                          
4 For a different view on the origins of the crisis, see Taylor (2009). 
5 On the growing US external deficit and its impact on the rest of the world, see especially Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2005) and Frankel (2007).  
6 In line with macroeconomic theory, ‘poorer countries should run larger current account deficits, and, 
symmetrically, richer countries should run larger current account surpluses’ (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002, p. 
148). 
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production to human capital and technology-intensive structures. Financial integration was 
not only seen as a mechanism through which resource allocation could become more effective 
between lenders and borrowers, but also as a process that could bolster the synchronization of 
business cycles, a preeminent condition of any optimum currency area (Fidrmuc, 2004; 
Mongelli, 2008). By eliminating the chances of asymmetric shocks, monetary policy was 
believed to be able to function at its optimum. 
 
The intensified capital flows among member states (mainly from the core to the more 
dynamic periphery), the active involvement of the financial intermediaries in cross-border 
transactions and the consequent huge shifts away from equilibria in current account positions, 
and the increasing gap in the savings-investment decisions were interpreted as the natural 
consequences of a well-functioning EMU. No-one seemed to bother about current account 
imbalances, especially in light of the fact that the overall external position of the eurozone 
was more or less in balance vis-à-vis the rest of the world (Gros and Alcidi, 2013). What is 
now considered as an institutional design flaw of EMU was celebrated as a positive feature 
for almost a decade (Baldwin and Gros, 2015). The European Commission (2008), for 
instance, equated the alleged success of the single currency with intensified capital flows 
among member states, which made it possible for the Greek and Spanish economies to 
thrive.7  
 
The Maastricht Treaty and its convergence criteria required countries to converge towards one 
another only in terms of nominal variables, and it left real variables such as unemployment, 
unit labour cost (ULCs, measuring competitiveness) or current account position untouched. 
Contrary to the main proposition of the endogenous theory of optimum currency areas 
(Frankel and Rose, 1998), differences in real variables were not eliminated. Financial 
integration did not support the much-awaited structural transformation of the borrower 
countries. Capital flows financed mostly the enhancement of non-tradable sectors, barely 
boosting the export capacities of the periphery. Housing bubbles in Ireland and Spain were 
mostly fed by those unprecedented financial flows. 
 
The total elimination of the exchange rate risk fed a credit boom in the periphery; even a 
minor difference in yields triggered substantial financial flows (Lane, 2010). Private investors 
did not segment the market; they perceived it as a single one – just like rating agencies or 
other major financial institutions worldwide (Feldstein, 2012). With the benefit of hindsight, it 
was in fact the single currency which helped some countries in the core to sharpen their 
productivity and to improve their external positions, leaving some others (in the periphery) to 
experience deterioration in their relative positions in terms of competitiveness and build up 
huge external deficits. 
 
Needless to say, the crisis-hit countries were not all alike. Greece was the typical example for 
short-sighted politics, tolerating, if not even endorsing, creative accounting and misreporting 
                                                          
7 The European Commission (2008) did not remain silent on intensifying differences in terms of economic 
growth, inflation rates or real effective exchange rates within the eurozone, but these divergences were identified 
as the certain accompanying phenomena of the catching up process.. 
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(e.g. Visvizi, 2012). Portugal, following its accession at a highly overvalued exchange rate, 
suffered from serious set-backs from its very first day in the eurozone, shortly facing the 
highest cumulative current account imbalance in the EU. Ireland and Spain witnessed a 
massive inflow of capital that fuelled a bubble in the real estate sector and contributed to 
rampant credit demand (see Table 7).  
 
Table 7. Cumulative current account and general government balances, and change in debt-to-
GDP ratio, 1999 to 2007 
 
 Cumulative current 
account balance (per 
cent of GDP) 
Cumulative general 
government balance 
(per cent of GDP) 
Change of debt-to-GDP 
ratio (per centage 
points) 
Portugal -96 -36 17.4 
Greece -84 -47 4.2 
Spain -60 2 -25.5 
Ireland -21 14 -22.7 
Italy -8 -26 -9.9 
France 6 -23 4.2 
Austria 16 -19 -1.6 
Germany 27 -19 3.5 
Belgium 47 -5 27.4 
Netherlands 48 -5 15.8 
Finland 61 33 -10 
Luxembourg 98 23 1 
Source: Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015, p. 36) and AMECO. 
 
It is often claimed that massive deficits in the current account come together with huge 
imbalances in the public sector (also called a twin deficit). According to Table 7, this was the 
case in Portugal and Greece, but not in Spain or Ireland, where the cumulative general 
government balance was positive and their public debt ratio declined. On the other hand, 
Germany, Austria and the Netherlands experienced surpluses in their current account while 
the general government displayed deficit. In short, the relationship between the current 
account and the general government was not at all straightforward among EU countries.  
 
The lack of a straightforward relationship between the external and the internal balances is 
due to the savings-investment behaviour of the private sector, a factor that had been totally 
neglected in pre-crisis analyses on the sustainability of the eurozone. In each of the crisis-hit 
economies, private investment significantly outgrew private domestic savings. The investment 
boom in Spain and Ireland was financed by foreign savings, coming from the core, especially 
from Germany. But the direction of capital flows – especially in a single market – can be 
easily reversed (Edwards, 2004). Both the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the Greek 
debt crisis of 2009-2010 in particular made foreign savers more cautious in their lending 
activities, resulting in a drying-up of foreign sources in the periphery, and in turn, in a 
collapse of their economies. Yet each of these countries, facing huge external deficits and a 
sudden stop in capital flows, had to face the same simple recipe for adjustment: having been 
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left without their own currencies and monetary policies, the only solution was internal 
devaluation i.e. a mix of public expenditure cuts, reduced wages and disinflation.  
 
It is true that the crisis-hit EMU countries did manage to close the export-import gap by 2016 
(Figure 1), with Ireland the star performer. But this also came in the form of stagnant or 
reduced import activities which may slow down their convergence processes. Somewhat 
perversely, even catching up nations such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary or 
Slovakia ran substantial current account surpluses in the last few years mostly due to the 
accelerated export activities of foreign (e.g. German) multinationals. 
 
A recovery in the periphery cannot be realised, however, without adjustment in the core 
countries. In other words, Germany and other surplus countries like the Benelux states should 
change their behaviour and instead of saving they should engage in consumption (and import) 
on a massive scale in the future. Currently, Germany has a staggering surplus (over 7 per 
cent) in its current account.8 In fact, at the time of writing, none of the crisis hit EMU 
economies can claim Germany as their number one export destination. The Irish export sector 
(in goods), for instance, relies mostly on the highly deficit-prone Brexit-bound UK (26 per 
cent), whereas the almost stagnating Italian (20.5 per cent) and French (26 per cent) 
economies, respectively, are the main absorbers of exported goods from Greece and Spain. 
Germany is ranked only second or third as the main trading partner of the crisis hit 
economies; that is, there is plenty of room for further increase if Germany is ready to take on 
such a role.9 
 
Figure 1. Current account position in selected countries, 2002-2015 
 
 
Source: authors, based on Eurostat (2017).  
 
                                                          
8 The value is even larger in the Netherlands (10 per cent). 
9 Thanks to German multinationals, the German market is much keen on importing goods from Austria, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland where its share in these countries’ export is over one-third.  
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IV. The Current Account and Competitiveness Post-Crisis 
 
Divergence in external imbalances between member states is often seen as a symptom of 
differences in competitiveness. Large current account deficits can be an indication of 
deficiencies in competitiveness, while countries with surplus balances can be seen as 
possessing a competitive edge over others. A deficit caused by weak export performance is a 
sign of issues with costs, or other aspects of competitiveness, which can usually be explained 
by the real appreciation of the exchange rate. Wages may grow faster than productivity, 
leading to rising ULCs. A deficit driven by income transfers can also reflect anomalies in 
competitiveness: foreign companies present in the economy may have few incentives to 
reinvest their earnings and decide to repatriate their profits. Broadly speaking, structural 
competitiveness issues can also be reflected in current account positions: the country may be 
unable to offset increasing ULCs in certain (low value) export sectors by moving to higher 
value added production (Szent-Iványi, 2017).  
 
As demonstrated in Section III, pre-crisis divergences in current account balances in the 
eurozone were not necessarily caused by deteriorations in competitiveness, but rather by a 
fundamental mismatch between savings and investments. Indeed, the export performances of 
many periphery countries running large current account deficits remained relatively robust, 
including Spain and Ireland, but also the Baltics (Kutasi, 2014). While they did experience 
sizeable increases in their ULCs, these were mainly driven by the non-tradable sectors (Kang 
and Shambaugh, 2015) and could be interpreted as the ultimate effect of convergence and 
catching up.  
 
It is worth examining the drivers of current account balances in the post-crisis era and whether 
these balances have become better indicators of national competitive positions. Figure 2 
shows the relationship between changes in the current account balances of member states, and 
changes in their real effective exchange rates, based on ULCs, between 2012 and 2015. The 
scatter plot shows a moderate relationship between the two variables in the period following 
Europe’s double-dip crisis. Current account balances deteriorated, or improved at a slower 
pace in countries that experienced appreciations in their REERs. The relationship, however, 
can reflect other dynamics as well. Severe internal devaluations in countries like Ireland, 
Greece or Cyprus have led to an improvement in the current accounts through a decrease in 
purchasing power and, in turn, a contraction of imports, although even in these cases it is 
expected that the export sector will also benefit at some point in the future.  
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Figure 2. Changes in competitiveness and current account balances, 2012-2015 
 
 
Source: authors, based on data from European Commission (2016, pp. 174 and 182) 
 
Real effective exchange rates based on ULCs, however, are rather simple measures of 
competitiveness, capturing primarily cost aspects of export competitiveness. Factors affecting 
the quality of exports, or changes in the country’s attractiveness for certain kinds of foreign 
investment are not reflected in changes in REER. It can thus also make sense to look at 
broader measures of competitiveness, such as the ranking based on the World Economic 
Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index (GCI; WEF, 2016). This composite indicator 
combines hard data (measuring cost and qualitative aspects of competitiveness for the entire 
economy) and soft data (such as surveys among corporate executives) to produce a holistic 
view of a country’s competitive position. Most member states experienced relatively minor 
changes in their positions between 2012 and 2016. Table 8 lists the countries which saw a 
change of four or more places in their positions, either in terms of improvement or 
deterioration.  
 
Table 8: Changes in GCI positions, 2012-2016 
 
Largest improvements Largest deteriorations 
Bulgaria (+24); Romania (+15); Latvia (+15); Malta 
(+11); Lithuania (+9); Czech Republic (+7); Ireland 
(+6); Poland (+5); Greece (+4); Slovakia (+4); Spain 
(+4) 
Cyprus (-36); Hungary (-21); Finland (-6); Denmark (-
4);  
Source: authors, based on WEF (2016). 
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Evidently, there was no correlation between changes in GCI rankings and changes in current 
account balances over the given period. This may be a result of two factors. First, the GCI 
measures aspects of competitiveness which would not show up in the current account, or 
would have an opposite effect on its balance as exports do, including factors which determine 
how favourable location a country is for various types of foreign direct investments. Second, 
this lack of any relationship can suggest that the impact of competitiveness on the current 
account balance is even lower in the post-crisis period than what Figure 2 suggested. It is 
nonetheless worthwhile examining the current account and competitive positions of some 
individual countries in more detail, especially the best and worst performers indicated in 
Table 8. 
 
Bulgaria has seen the greatest improvements in its competitiveness (despite a large 
appreciation in its ULC-based REER in recent years), which was accompanied by a 
substantial improvement in its current account position. A number of reforms in recent years, 
including the strengthening of the financial sector after a large bank failure in 2014, 
simplifying the procedures for starting businesses, EU-funded public investments in 
infrastructure, judicial reform and fiscal consolidation have all contributed to improving 
competitiveness. Rising ULCs reflect a catching up process with the rest of the region, given 
that Bulgaria has the lowest wages in the EU. However, it also represents bottlenecks in the 
labour market, which suffers from skills shortages and emigration (IMF, 2016e). Increasing 
domestic demand is likely to return the country’s current account into a deficit in the coming 
years, seen as normal for convergence countries. Latvia also showed similar dynamics to 
Bulgaria, and the country’s journey is highly interesting: its large improvement came after 
significant deterioration following the crisis, and, at least in terms of its competitiveness 
ranking, the country was in a similar position last year where it started a decade before. In 
Romania, the improving rankings were accompanied by a lower current account deficit and 
depreciating REER. The country’s high profile anti-corruption drive has been well regarded 
internationally10, reforms aimed at stabilizing the banking system, prudent government 
policies, and a well performing economy driven by domestic consumption have all supported 
Romania’s performance. 
 
On the other hand, Cyprus and Hungary were the two biggest losers in terms of 
competitiveness in recent years. Cyprus suffered heavily following a banking and sovereign 
debt crisis in 2012-13, and was forced to enter into a bailout agreement with the IMF and the 
European institutions, leading to a number of austerity measures. The Cypriot government 
successfully stabilized the economy by the end of 2015 and was able to exit the bailout 
agreement early in 2016 (IMF 2016f, 2016g). The country’s REER depreciated by more than 
13 per cent between 2012 and 2015, a welcome sign of improving competitiveness. Public 
debt however remains high, banks are still plagued by a high proportion of non-performing 
loans, both of which significantly harm potential growth (IMF 2016g). While Hungary had a 
surplus in its current account for years, and its REER also depreciated substantially, the 
deterioration of public institutions, policy instability, the lack of investment in healthcare and 
                                                          
10 Politico, 12 February 2016. 
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education, and increasing corruption have hit the country’s competitive position hard. 
Hungary’s economy has been performing well in the past years, driven by strong export 
performance, but the favourable macroeconomic performance could not counterbalance long 
term structural decline.11 Feeble consumption and investment growth indicate that the strong 
current account surplus is likely to remain. The country which was the star performer of 
Central and Eastern Europe in the nineties is now the lowest ranked in the region, and only 
three EU member states, Croatia, Cyprus and Greece have worse competitive positions.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The European economy continued its recovery in 2016, albeit at a slightly slower pace. 
Driven mainly by consumption and investment, the relatively good growth performance 
generated somewhat higher inflation, more jobs and improving government balances. The 
sustainability of the recovery, however, is questioned by a number of external factors: the 
slowdown of the global economy, the weakening expansion of international trade, the election 
of Donald Trump, and, most importantly, Brexit, which poses perhaps the most serious threat 
to the European project in its entire existence.  
 
Europe’s good performance has opened up some fiscal space for most governments, although 
public debt remains high and decreasing it will be an issue for years to come. European 
publics however have clearly tired of austerity politics and have been turning away from the 
mainstream political parties most closely associated with these. The rise of right and left wing 
populism, and the political challenges such parties can mount, should also be seen as 
significant threats to Europe’s future economic performance. Although there are signs in early 
2017 that the global economy may have started to pick up,12 it is questionable when and how 
exactly such a trend may exert an impact on the public mood. 
 
The second half of the contribution focused on re-assessing the role of external imbalances in 
the crisis, as well as how external imbalances and member state competitive positions have 
evolved post-crisis. Studying the current account positions and the competitiveness of 
member states implies the explicit acknowledgement that the crisis was not exogenous to the 
EU but it was rather endogenous to it, a direct consequence of how EMU was designed. If the 
EU wants to prevent its member states from further struggles and even situations close to 
default, it needs to redesign the architecture of the eurozone and preferably the whole EU in 
such a way that promotes real convergence. While crisis-hit economies (especially Greece and 
Portugal) are still expected to undertake a lot in terms of structural reforms, core countries 
with large surpluses in their current accounts should also change their behaviour and increase 
their aggregate demand by boosting household consumption and public spending. Whether 
such a change should necessarily mean a total rebalancing of the current divide between so-
called supply-side growth strategies of the core and the demand-driven growth strategies of 
                                                          
11 Financial Times, 9 June 2015.  
12 The Economist, 16 March 2017. 
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the periphery (Hall, 2012) is a question that needs careful analysis. What this contribution did 
find, however, is that current account balances have become much less reliable indicators of 
export competitiveness than what standard textbook arguments imply.  
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